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"NO MORE DEATHS": ON CONSCIENCE, CIVIL




In 2006, the United States government attempted to try, convict, and
imprison a young man and young woman for saving lives.' This reality seems
brutally improbable in a new American century that has left an unexpected
psychological imprint of fear and death upon the American mind. If the turn of
the century was marked by Y2K fears of global shutdown2 and shock at the easy
ability of terrorists to strike at the heart of American government armed only
with box-cutters, more recent American experience is defined by daily suicide
strikes at civilians and military alike in Iraq, the brutal taunt to American moral
authority that is Abu Ghraib,3 and the ominous breakdown of civil society in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina.4 In such a time, when the government's message is
. Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law and editor, The Journal of Law and
Religion. My thanks to my research assistant, Scott Michael, for his invaluable research help with
this project and to the UST faculty workshop.
1 A. J. Flick, No More Deaths; Pair Fail to Get Case Dropped, TUCSON CITIZEN, Jan. 13, 2006, at
4A (noting that U.S. Magistrate Judge had denied a request for dismissal of the charges against
Shanti Sellz and Daniel Strauss for smuggling illegal aliens, and that the magistrate's decision has
been sent to U.S. Judge Raner Collins for final decision. However, on September 1, 2006, Judge
Collins dismissed all charges against Sellz and Strauss, stating in his ruling that "Sellz and Strauss
had made reasonable efforts to ensure that their actions were not in violation of the law, and that
'further prosecution would violate the Defendant's [sic] due process rights."' Charges Dismissed
Against Tucson Humanitarians, No More Deaths website, http://nomoredeaths.org/
index.php?option=comcontent&task--view&id=38&Itemid=31 (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). The
judge noted that Sellz and Strauss acted under the belief that they were following a protocol
agreement between No More Deaths and the Border Patrol, though the Patrol now denies that such
an agreement existed. See Djamila Grossman, Entrant Rescuers Believed Acts OK'd, ARIZ. DAILY
STAR, Sept. 5, 2006, at B1).
2 See Ted Prince, Y2K + 5, J. OF COMMERCE L, Jan. 3, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 217968
(noting that "Ulust five years ago, the world was paralyzed with fear about the potential technical
failure from thefin de siecle.").
3 See Mike Fitts, Documentary Traces How America's Treatment of Prisoners Went Wrong,
COLUMBIA STATE, Oct. 18, 2005, Sect. A, available at 2005 WLNR 16836812 (describing the
Pentagon decision to toughen up interrogation and detention at Abu Ghraib prison, and the
resulting treatment by American soldiers: "Prisoners are stripped naked and held in stressful
positions for hours; confronted with dogs, a particular fear for Arab men; subjected to other
humiliations designed to break Muslim men, including the use of female interrogators in sexual
role-playing.").
4 See Doug Saunders, Nasty, Brutish-Society's Net Snaps: Every-Man-for-Himself Ethos Serves
Americans Poorly in Times of Crisis When People Must Pull Together, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL
Sept. 2, 2005, at A-12, available at 2005 WLNR 13801972 (describing social breakdown in the
wake of Katrina); Geoffrey Nunberg, Nation Struggles to Find the Right Words for Hurricane
Survivors and What They Did, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 11, 2005, at 3, available at 2005
WLNR 15664615 (describing difficulty of explaining refugee state of emergency, looting and other
activity that occurred in the wake of the storm).
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centered on the nobility of risking one's life to save countless others' freedom,
the irony that the government wants to imprison those who risk their freedom to
save countless others' lives cannot be sharper. In the words of one humanitarian
worker, "If the government wins this case . . . we will be faced with a
government-sanctioned policy of killing migrants to enforce our laws."'
And yet, the government tried desperately to imprison two young people for
as much as fifteen years for saving lives,6 as an example to others not to save
lives (at least not in the same way).7 Shanti Sellz and Daniel Strauss were
prosecuted for driving into the bleak Arizona desert, spotting three Mexican
nationals immobilized by pain from drinking contaminated water from cattle
tanks in their desperate attempt to complete an illegal border crossing, and taking
them to the hospital.8 They were treated as criminals because the hospital is on
the American side of the border, in Tucson.9  Charged with transporting
undocumented workers in violation of federal immigration law and with
conspiracy,'0 they are, from the government's perspective, the legal equivalent of
the "coyotes" who extort money from desperate families to smuggle immigrants
across the border in trucks and freight cars, sometimes to die imprisoned in those
cartons." They are, in the eyes of the government, the legal equivalent of alien
drug smugglers, who carry weapons and contempt for human life, who have
terrorized residents in the borderlands and caused the Arizona and New Mexico
governors to declare a "state of emergency" in those counties.12
5 Andrew Gumbel, America Tightens Control of Mexican Border, Mexicans are Trying to Enter the
United States Illegally in Greater Numbers Than Ever. Now a 2,000-Mile Fence is Planned-and
Those Who Offer Migrants Aid are Being Prosecuted, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, Dec. 20, 2005, at 1
(citing University of Arizona geologist Edgar McCullough at a church rally for the pair in Tucson);
Humanitarian Aide Volunteers Face Possibility of Prison, NEW AM. MEDIA, Jan. 19, 2006,
available at www.indybay.org/news/2006/01/1796511 .php (last visited Mar. 14, 2006).
6 Ernesto Portillo, '05 Border Bill Punishes Those Aiding Entrants, Foes Contend, ARiz. DAILY
STAR, Jan. 26, 2006, available at http://www.azstarnet.com/metro/l13043 (last visited Mar. 14,
2006) (noting that the punishment for their crimes is up to 15 years in prison plus a $500,000 fine).
7 Michael Marizco, No More Deaths; Activists to Reject Plea Deal, ARIz. DAILY STAR, July 22,
2005, at BI, available at http://www.azstarnet.com/sn/border/85261.php (quoting USC law
professor Jean Rosenbluth, who suggested that the case was brought to set "ground rules for what
can and can't be done in helping illegal entrants," and that the government may be trying to tell
citizens, "'you don't get to decide when to help an illegal alien').
8 Gumbel, supra note 5, at 2.
9 Indeed, they were advised by 911 personnel whom they consulted that the Tucson hospital was
the place they should take the aliens. See NEW AM. MEDIA, supra note 5, at 1.
10 Gumbel, supra note 5, at 1; Angie C. Marek, Border Wars, U.S NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov.
28, 2005, at 50 (describing coyotes charging more than $1,500 per head for "brutal treks through
the sun-baked desert").
" Marek, supra note 10, at 54.
12 Stephen Franklin, Law, Aid Groups at Odds On the Border, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 28, 2005, available
at www.bradenton.com/mld/bradenton/news/nation/12500826.htm?template=contentM (last visited
Jan. 22, 2006) (noting Arizona and New Mexico declarations of states of emergency to deal with
"the crisis of drug trafficking and illegal migration").
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Daniel Strauss and Shanti Sellz are not alone. They are part of an emerging
American grassroots movement seeking to respond with compassion to those
who seek an economically viable existence in the United States for themselves
and their families. Perhaps the most prominent of the several organizations in
this movement is the volunteer alliance No More Deaths, which leaves food and
water in the Arizona desert for crossing immigrants who risk their lives in the
brutal terrain in hopes of finding a livelihood. 3 No More Deaths volunteers have
provided food, water or medical attention to at least 175 Latin American
immigrants; among them are a migrant given glucose in a diabetic coma, a victim
of an assault and robbery after his four month journey to the United States, and a
grandmother, mother, father and child who fell sick in the desert.1 4  These
volunteers risk encounters with immigration coyotes and drug smugglers in the
desert because they recognize the desperate need of others.
Moreover, this movement acknowledges, in a way the federal government
does not, the difficult set of choices for the poorest citizens of Mexico--choices
which some analysts attribute to deliberate American foreign and domestic policy
initiatives. On one hand, analysts argue, the American embrace of NAFTA has
substantially damaged the employment opportunities of the poorest of Mexico's
poor, making illegal border crossings increasingly more a necessity than a
choice.'" On the other hand, years of federal "solutions" to the border wars, such
as sealing more hospitable entryways through southern California, have driven
desperate Mexicans into the arms of "coyotes" (who help undocumented workers
cross, usually for an exorbitant fee) or into the forbidding Arizona desert.'6
This is, of course, not the first time the United States has fought border
battles against individual conscience. As Barbara Bezdek,17 Ignatius Bau,18 and
other historians have documented, the Sanctuary movement of the 1980s,
mounted along this same border with some of the same cast of characters,
struggled against the United States government over the right of citizens to aid
desperate immigrants crossing the border without government permission. The
United States won that battle, successfully convicting a number of human rights
13 Gumbel, supra note 5, at 2.
14 Press Release, Faith-Based Group Rescues 175 People In the Sonoran Desert, at
www.nomoredeaths.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2006); Franklin, supra note 12, at 1 (noting
Defendant Sellz recounting the rescue of the family and telling the story of a seriously ill,
dehydrated young man whom she held in her lap on the way to the hospital, who said to her, "'Call
my sister and tell her when I die."').
15 See notes 40 to 43 infra and accompanying text.
16 Marek, supra note 10, at 50 (noting that 37% of border crossers are now coming through the
Arizona desert).
17 Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the Politics of Citizen
Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REv. 899 (1995); James Reel, Sanctuary Leaders Renew Defense of
Asylum Seekers, 38 NAT'L CATH. REP. 7 (Apr. 5, 2002).
18 IGNATIUS BAU, THIS GROUND IS HOLY: CHURCH SANCTUARY AND CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES
(1985).
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activists "crossing" immigrants who, in activists' opinions, were legally in this
country as political refugees from the death squads of El Salvador. '9
However, at least according to published reports, two legally relevant facts
distinguish the new humanitarian movement in the Arizona desert. First, the
current refugees flee not political persecution and death squads but the
destruction of their employment and economy. Because federal law recognizes,
for some small class of immigrants, the right to seek refuge in the United States if
they are politically persecuted but does not recognize the right of the starving to
cross the border,2 neither these immigrants nor their saviors are on as juridically
solid ground as Sanctuary movement workers would seem to have been. Indeed,
members of the Sanctuary movement, under the rubric of civil initiative, argued
essentially that they had virtually created a parallel legal system that was
enforcing United States immigration law according to its true purRose and letter,
while it was the federal government that was acting as the outlaw.
Conversely, unlike Sanctuary workers, those who volunteer for No More
Deaths and other such groups do not explicitly seek to "cross" illegal immigrants
into the United States so they can melt into the economy and find work. The
movement, at least publicly, only seeks to provide crossing immigrants with
humanitarian aid that makes it more likely that they will survive the desert when
they cross the border.22 As the defendants argued in the Sellz and Strauss
prosecutions, that fact should militate against a finding that No More Deaths
seeks to "aid and abet" foreign nationals crossing illegally into the United
States.23 Movement members claim that theirs is a textbook first year Criminal
19 Reel, supra note 17, at 7 (noting that eight of the eleven Sanctuary workers arrested were
convicted of felonies, though none went to prison; all but one who received a suspended sentence
were placed on probation).20 Bezdek, supra note 17, at 940-41.
21 Bezdek's marvelous account of the history of the Sanctuary movement emphasizes the way in
which the Sanctuary movement workers countered their portrayal as outlaws with the concept of
civil initiative, which understands the state as a potential threat to the rule of law and the duty of
citizens to carry out the rule of law when necessary. Id. at 941-45, 970-82.
22 Stephanie Innes, Lawyer: Aid to Migrants Was Legal, ARiz. DAILY STAR, Jan. 6, 2006, at B5,
available at 2006 WLNR 1423804 (defending Sellz and Strauss actions of humanitarian aid,
including driving them to get medical attention, as within the law, and noting that the Border Patrol
was aware of the 68 medical evacuations made by No More Deaths from October, 2004 to
September, 2005); see also Tim Vanderpool, Arizona's Underground Railroad, 65 THE
PROGREssIvE 26 (2001) (quoting Rev. Robin Hoover, distinguishing the movement from the
Sanctuary movement for "lobbying to change immigration policies and providing only direct,
emergency assistance." However, former Sanctuary advocate John Fife claims "members are free
to act upon their consciences..." by breaking the law by hiding and transporting immigrants,
which is "up to each individual.").
23 Flick, supra note 1, at 5A (quoting Magistrate Judge Bernardo Velasco indicating, "the issue,
therefore, is whether the illegal aliens treated at Southside Presbyterian Church and thereafter
allowed to melt into Tucson, Arizona, have been assisted 'in furtherance' of their illegal entry ....
The answer is yes."); Innes, supra note 22; Marizco, supra note 7 (noting that the defendants took
the sick immigrants a ride to their base camp, the Ark of the Covenant, and then offered them a ride
to medical care).
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Law elemental defense: to aid and abet a crime, one must not only seek to help
the principal who commits the crime, but also have the purpose that the crime be
committed. While No More Deaths workers clearly seek to assist the immigrant
principals, they do not aim by their action to cause the ultimate result, an illegal
border crossing, though federal law references to reckless assistance seem to
ensnare more than the ordinary abettor.24
Neither of these distinctions seems to matter to the federal government. In
the 1980s, Sanctuary movement participants charged that the government
relentlessly stripped refugees crossing the border of their rights, ignoring their
putative claim to be "legal" immigrants.25 In the contemporary successor
struggle, the federal government has ignored No More Deaths participants'
claims that they are not coyotes seeking to help illegal immigrants to cross the
border.26
While this article presents a brief history of the current and historical
controversy, it does not seek to enter the dispute on the international legality or
the morality of the government's action in repressing illegal immigration across
24 8 U.S.C. 1324 (1)(A) provides that
[a]ny person who---(i) knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or attempts to bring
to the United States in any manner whatsoever such person at a place other than a
designated port of entry or place other than as designated by the Commissioner,
regardless of whether such alien has received prior official authorization to come to,
enter, or reside in the United States and regardless of any future official action which
may be taken with respect to such alien.
However, under this statute, once the alien is in the United States, the mens rea requirement is
relaxed. A person is a criminal if she
(ii) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or
remains in the United States in violation of law, transports, or moves or attempts to
transport or move such alien within the United States by means of transportation or
otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law; (iii) knowing or in reckless
disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States
in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to
conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any
building or any means of transportation; (iv) encourages or induces an alien to come
to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact
that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law.
This provision also punishes "any conspiracy to commit any of the preceding acts," or aiding and
abetting such acts. Under the statute, defendants do not apparently have to possess traditional
"accessory" mens rea. See, e.g., United States v. Guerra-Garcia, 336 F.3d 19, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2003)
(accepting "willful blindness" jury instructions and circumstantial evidence to infer recklessness
about the alienage status of a transported alien).
25 Bezdek, supra note 17, at 939-43.
26 Flick, supra note 1, at 5A (noting denial of motion to dismiss); Innes, supra note 22, at B5
(noting prosecutors' claims that the persons defendants aided "weren't in dire need of medical aid"
and that defendants were illegally aiding their entry); Bezdek, supra note 17, at 903 (noting that
federal officials responded to the 1980's sanctuary defendants as if they "were practicing
coyotismo, the cruel servitude into which entrepreneurial alien smugglers sell any whom they can
slip into the United States.")
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the Arizona border or prosecuting No More Deaths volunteers for aiding such
immigration, as much as that dispute sorely needs to be taken up. While the
border-crossers do not appear to be refugees in the technical sense, the effect of
the American position on the willingness of other countries to take economic
refugees who are displaced by famine or destruction of economic infrastructures
may be significant.
Nor does this article seek to recite long-standing and well-argued positions
about objective situational criteria which may permit legal recognition of
conscientious disobedience to statutory law, such as a Free Exercise Clause right
of conscientious disobedients to "violate" immigration law to save the lives of
foreign border-crossers.27 That dispute also needs to be taken up more seriously
than it was by the government, either during the Sanctuary movement or today.
However, the Supreme Court's current unwillingness to budge from Employment28
Division v. Smith, with its harsh view that neutral and generally applicable laws
cannot be challenged by most First Amendment "right of conscience" claims,29
leaves such a discussion for further development in light of the Court's recent
interpretations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.3°
Instead of these well-worn paths, I want to approach the problem of civil
disobedience at the border from the other side; that is, from the experience of the
conscientious disobedient. Drawing from theological sources, I want to probe
the question, when do disobedients know that the conscience is true, such that it
may make a moral claim against the positive law of the state for which a moral
response is due? In concrete terms, what is the difference between a coyote
scofflaw and a No More Deaths volunteer? Second, how might the government
juridically respond to the conscientious disobedient in a practical way that
27 See United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d, 950, 955-57 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying defendant's right to
bring a Free Exercise challenge on the grounds that the government had demonstrated that it used
the least restrictive alternative toward its compelling state interest in protecting its borders); United
States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 663, 694-96 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the government's interest in
controlling immigration outweighed defendant Sanctuary workers' religious interests and that an
exemption "would not be feasible").
2' 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
29 See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1216 (2006)
(acknowledging that Smith rejected Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) in its application of the
compelling state interest test to facially constitutional, generally applicable laws, and noting that
the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit governments from burdening religious practices through
such laws).
30 Id. at 1216-17 (acknowledging that in RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq, Congress has statutorily
required the federal government not to burden a person's exercise of religion "even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability" unless the government can satisfy the compelling
interest test---to "demonstrate that [the] application of the burden to the person---1) is in
furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling government interest.") In Gonzalez, the Court held that the government had not
demonstrated its burden with respect to these elements. 126 S. Ct. at 1216. In light of the previous
Sanctuary cases, however, it is somewhat doubtful whether a No More Deaths volunteer could be
successful even under the statutory standard.
[Vol. 75:2
NO MORE DEA THS
accepts the mixed political, legal and moral nature of a disobedient's claim
against the state? This question implicates the relationship between natural or
moral law and positive law in a way best summed up by defendant Sellz: "I still
can't understand how Americans can view some people as illegal and not worthy
of their care because they've crossed this imaginary [border] line.'
My argument, borrowing from Lutheran theology, is that it is very difficult
to determine when the conscience is true, either in the Free Exercise sense of
when it might be considered "sincere," or in the sense that it rightly perceives
objective reality and acts correctly based on the moral situation presented to it.
However, rather than implying, as Justice Scalia asserts in Smith, that this reality
must necessarily result in government's refusal to recognize the claims of
individual conscience to avoid anarchy, where "every citizen [is] a law unto
himself, '32 I will argue the opposite. I will suggest that the realities of human
conscience make it incumbent on government to respond with an adjudicatory
body capable of probing the arguments of conscientious disobedients and
insisting that the government face the reality of its actions. That is, I will suggest
that it is incumbent on Congress to establish, through legislation, a national truth
commission that can probe the social and political realities of situations like the
current Arizona border dispute and speak truth to power about the consequences
of the United States policy.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TWO BORDER DISPUTES: HOW
IMMIGRANTS HAVE COME TO DIE IN THE ARIZONA DESERT
Even by the numbers, the story is tragic, almost surreal. In the year
between October 1999 and September 2000, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service apprehended 1.65 million border crossers in the Southwest, up more than
100,000 from the year before.33 During that same period, 369 people died trying
to cross into the United States from Mexico, compared with 231 the previous
year.
34
Between October 2004 and September 2005, some 279 to 460 persons died
in border crossings,35 and an estimated 1.19 million were arrested as illegal.36
Since 1994, when the Border Patrol implemented its strategy to blockade
Southern California cities of entry with fences and Texas borders with Border
31 Margaret Poe, Iowa-Area Samaritan Faces Jail Time, THE DAILY IOWAN, Dec. 15, 2005, via U-
Wire.
32 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
33 Vanderpool, supra note 22, at 26.
34 Id.
35 See No More Deaths website homepage, http://www.nomoredeaths.org/Links.html (reporting
279 deaths in a "counter") (last visited Mar. 10, 2006); Vanderpool, supra note 22, at 26 (reporting
279 deaths); Marek, supra note 10, at 60 (reporting an FY 2005 figure of 460 deaths, and quoting
an official estimating that the number is probably two to three times higher).36 Marek, supra note 10, at 50 (also noting that the number of illegal aliens in the United States rose
from 8.4 million in 2000 to 11 million this year).
2006]
UMKC LA W REVIEW
Patrol cordons,37 an estimated 2600 people have died trying to make the border
crossing, 38 almost as many as the 2746 victims killed in the World Trade Center
in the 9/11 attacks. 39 For those willing to limit the cost to economic terms only,
the numbers are equally chilling. In September 2005, Pima County (Tucson)
administrator Chuck Huckelberry told county supervisors that it costs the county
about $300,000 annually to "recover and store the bodies of illegal immigrants
who die in Pima County," more than ten times the annual cost of water stations
placed in the desert to help illegal immigrants survive.4 °
Critics of American border policy blame these deaths on what might be
termed an unintended "pincer movement" of American foreign and domestic
policy. On one hand, critics such as Professor Jose Alvarez have argued that the
fallout of the U.S.-dominated NAFTA agreement has been that "Mexican
policymakers are expected to complete and institutionalize an economic
revolution without the resources needed to alleviate the inevitable adjustment
pains."4' As a result of U.S. indifference to the predictable consequences of
these decisions, "the Mexican people, especially those on the bottom of Mexican
society, are now facing severe economic dislocations, which range from sectorial
unemployment to a rising tide of bankruptcies for small and medium-sized
Mexican firms, 42 as well as the decimation of Mexican farmers' livelihoods.43
Critics thus reject the prediction that NAFTA will stem the tide of Mexican
emigration to the United States by increasing the flow of foreign investment; in
fact, they argue, it will increase Mexican immigration as traditional wage labor
37 See id. at 50 (noting that the Border Patrol lined up agents along the Rio Grande within eyesight
of each other, and built a fence with floodlights on the San Diego part of the border to keep
immigrants out).
38 Evan Silverstein, Arizona Presbyterians Patrol Desert to Keep Migrants Alive, PRESBYTERIAN
NEWS SVC., June 18, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.pcusa.org/pcnews/2004/04295.htm (last
visited Sept. 28, 2006).
39 2001 Victims website, www.septemberllvictims.com/septemberllvictims/default.asp (noting
2948 confirmed dead, and twenty-four reported dead). The 9/11 Commission Report lists 2152
fatalities at the World Trade Center. See www.septemberi lvictims.com/septemberl Ivictims/
fullreport.pdf, at 316.
40 Garry Duffy, County OKs $25Kfor Water Stations in Desert, TUCSON CITIZEN, Sept. 7,2005,
available at www.tucsoncitizen.com/print/local/090705a6_supervisors. Duffy notes that it costs
the county $8 million per year to hold detainees in the Tucson county jail. See also Marek, supra
note 10, at 50 (noting that the Border Patrol has had to hire 1000 border agents to patrol 261 miles
of Arizona desert).
41 Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement's Chapter 11,
28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 303, 305 (1997).
42 Id.
43 Michael Riley, Student Volunteers are Spending the Summer in the Treacherous Arizona Desert,
Providing Water and Food to Save the Lives of Illegal Border Crossers. Their Goal is Forcing
Change in Immigration Policy-and They're Willing to Risk Arrest To Do So. Convictions On the
Line Life-and-Death Lessons Abound of Those Aiding Migrants' Pilgrimage, DENVER POST, Aug.
22, 2004, at A01.
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structures are disrupted, and women take the place of men in the Mexican
industrial workforce," creating the "desperate plight of the underclass.""
The other "pincer" of this movement has been the U.S. response to illegal
immigration, both before and after September 11 th. The immigration situation is
chaotic, particularly in Arizona, where border crossers face death both from cold
and heat,45 as well as bandits, scorpions, snakes, and vultures. 46 Border Patrol
pilot Joe Dunn summed up the situation in stark terms, "If we see signs
[footprints] in the desert on Monday and we don't find the group ... we start
checking for their dead bodies on Wednesday." 47 Women crossing have
reportedly been raped by bandits or immigration coyotes.48
As an example of this state of chaos, in just one day, January 14, 2006,
Arizona TV station KVOA reported that the Border Patrol identified 15-20
illegal aliens attempting to cross the border. The anchor noted, "Most ran away.
But three ran into oncoming traffic. Two of those immigrants were airlifted to
University Medical Center. The third fled the scene... Border Patrol has at least
four of the illegal immigrants in custody."49 The next story, reporting that the
case of Sellz and Strauss was headed to trial, noted that at the same time, Sergio
Mendez-Gomea and Irma Morfin-Mendez were facing charges for holding two
young border-crossers hostage for ransom while smuggling a larger group into
the United States. A third story reported that lengthy security backups at the
border were causing produce truck drivers to sit still for hours as their cargo
withered, delivering a major multi-million dollar blow to Nogales, which has
become a key center for storing American produce after hurricane damage in the
Gulf.5 °
Human rights critics blame the tragedies in the Arizona desert on INS
strategies of heavy enforcement near border towns, which has driven immigrants
to cross the borders in the desert.5' Ironically, the decision of the INS to crack
down in border cities such as Los Angeles was not driven by 9/11 security
concerns but by the Clinton Administration's attempt to appease political critics
of the porous southern border.52 Since 9/11, however, national concerns that the
44 Alvarez, supra note 41, at 311-12. See also Gumbel, supra note 5, at 2; Riley, supra note 43, at
3.
45 Silverstein, supra note 38, at 2 (quoting Rev. John Fife who notes that many migrants freeze to
death up in the mountains, including 400 people who died in the desert during a January storm, as
well as dying of thirst, heat stroke, or exhaustion because of lack of shade or natural water).
46 Id.; Riley, supra note 43, at 2.
47 Marek, supra note 10, at 52 (noting that the Border Patrol has erected rescue beacons, or "panic"
poles that state in English and Spanish, "You are in danger of dying if you do not summon for
help.").
48 Riley, supra note 43, at 3.
49 KVOA News (television broadcast Jan. 14, 2006).
50 
Id.
51 Vanderpool, supra note 22, at 27; Riley, supra note 43, at 3.
52 Gumbel, supra note 5, at 2 (noting that Republican conservatives in Congress "have co-opted the
language of Mr. Bush's war on terror and the notion of a nation under threat from a shadowy
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southern border presents a likely place of entry for terrorists, coupled with
regional concerns about the growing violence on the border, have heightened the
urgency of response to the problem.
While there is no evidence that terrorists have actually crossed the southern
border, Congress has responded to this purported threat by authorizing more
money for more border security and proposing the erection of a 2000-mile wall
across the border to keep immigrants out physically,5 3 reminiscent of Israel's
anti-suicide-bomber wall built at the Gaza strip, which Mexican president
Vincente Fox has likened to the Berlin Wall.54 Moreover, scores of citizens are
terrified by reports of growing violence by immigration coyotes, who now carry
guns and increasingly represent Mexican organized crime gangs.55 Some citizens
are forming armed patrols to monitor vast stretches of border that Border Patrol
forces cannot sufficiently patrol.5 6 The border violence that has prompted these
citizen posse groups to form is in part the result of attempts by drug cartels to
cross illegal drugs into the United States, but the violence is being blamed on
other illegal immigrants as well. 7 T.J. Bonner, president of the Border Patrol
agents' union, suggests that the government will need a 400-year plan because
"that's how long he calculates it will take to bring security to the entire border at
the agency's current pace.
58
Into this breach have come scores of volunteers, largely operating out of
religious communities, providing humane assistance to persons crossing the
border in the Baboquivari Mountain region of Arizona (termed "the center of the
universe" for undocumented workers trying to enter the country).59 The legally
visible symbols of this movement, Daniel Strauss and Shanti Sellz, typify the
idealism of their generation. Strauss, a twenty-four year old Manhattan native
from a "not very religious" Jewish family, attended the Ethical Culture Fieldston
School, a "school that promotes ethics, community service and academic
excellence," volunteered in a Bronx soup kitchen, and mentored children as a
foreign enemy, and adapted it to the impoverished Mexicans making their painful way through the
desert brush night after night").
53 Gumbel, supra note 5, at 1; Marek, supra note 10, at 54 (describing the erection of the fence in
San Diego, and the planned installation of railroad ties in the Arizona desert to prevent illegal
aliens from driving into the U.S.).
54 Gumbel, supra note 5, at 1.
55 Marek, supra note 10, at 52 (noting that many residents of the Rio Grande Valley are "terrified to
go outside their homes".); Riley, supra note 43, at A 01.
56 Gumbel, supra note 5 at 1; Marek, supra note 10, at 52 (discussing the Minutemen who have
formed armed teams to patrol the desert, and "interior enforcement" groups that photograph
employers who pick up day laborers). Marek discusses the dangers faced by Border Patrol agents,
who are showered with rocks every night, and who were assaulted at least 687 times in FY 2005.
Marek, supra note 10, at 52. Many agents drive "war wagons," equipped with metal caging around
the windows. Id.
57 Marek, supra note 10, at 52. Marek quotes estimates that about 450,000 of the 11 million
immigrants in this country have criminal records. Id. at 56.
58 Id. at 52.
59 Silverstein, supra note 38, at 1.
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Colorado college student.60  In 2004, Strauss joined the No More Deaths
volunteers in the desert "out of compassion for the undocumented immigrants
who flee poverty in their home countries and cross the border on foot."6' Shanti
Sellz, twenty-three years old, who also grew up as a non-religious Jew in Iowa
City, embraced her parents' emphasis on volunteerism, caring for others, and
"'doing something worthwhile for humanity,"' as demonstrated by her seven
months' service as a volunteer in an Ecuadoran ecological center after high
school.62
These defendants are the media figureheads for a second wave of
humanitarian immigration volunteers, organized by a number of faith-based
groups. Some of the first-wave leaders, like Reverend John Fife, a Tucson
Presbyterian minister, have re-activated their work from the 1980s in response to
the current crisis. 63 Others are converts to the movement, local citizens and
others coming from around the country to help.64 One local woman explained
her participation by saying, "[t]hey show up at your door and collapse in your
arms weeping. How are you going to turn your back on that? ' 65 Others, such as
Sellz, are driven by the indifference of both border patrols and average citizens
who pass "dozens of people attempting to flag down assistance. 66
However, unlike the Sanctuary movement, these volunteers are not
primarily focused on aiding immigrants in crossing the border. Rather, they are
focused on saving lives. The Samaritan Patrol, which has operated since July
2000, "roam[s] the desert in Jeeps and vans [for six to eight hours after daybreak]
looking for stranded migrants, to whom they offer food, water, and medical help.
'The bottom line is to save as many lives as possible,"' noted Fife.67 No More
Deaths members distribute water bottles and "migrant paks," baggies of
carbohydrate-loaded snacks, as they walk through desert washes frequented by
crossers shouting in Spanish, "[w]e're friends, don't be afraid .... We've got
water and food," in part to avoid attack.68 Humane Borders, another faith-based
organization, has set up more than forty water stations in the desert.69 Often, the
help these groups summon is from the Border Patrol, which takes thirst and sick
crossers to receive medical care before deporting them back to Mexico. 0
60 Ernesto Portillo Jr., Parents Proud of Two Volunteers Facing Prison for Driving Migrants, ARIZ.
DAILY STAR, Dec. 20, 2005, at B1, available at 2005 WLNR 22479549.
61 id.
62id.
63 Vanderpool, supra note 22, at 26.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Poe, supra note 31, at 1.
67 Silverstein, supra note 38, at 1.
68 Riley, supra note 43, at AO.
69 Silverstein, supra note 38, at 1. Silverstein notes that during the summer "'season of death...
volunteers patrol seven days a week; but in the winter, when migrants face less hazardous
conditions, they go out only two to three days a week. Id.70 Vanderpool, supra note 22, at 26.
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The federal government has responded bluntly to the claims of volunteers
that they are not breaking the law. 71 Tucson Border Patrol Supervisor Gustavo
Soto has stated, "'It is illegal for anyone to transport undocumented persons
regardless of the reason,' adding that if anyone encounters an undocumented
person in need of medical care, 'the apropriate response would be to contact 911
and get the proper authorities there.'
However, the volunteers' actions might be more clearly illegal under a
little-noted provision of H.R. 4437, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and
Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, passed by the House of Representatives
in December 2005. 73 One provision of that bill, humanitarians argue, could make
it a felony to provide any humanitarian assistance to undocumented immigrants
anywhere in the United States, punishable by up to fifteen years in prison and
$500,000 in fines.74 The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee on
Migration, among others, has denounced this bill, noting:
Current federal law does not require humanitarian groups to ascertain legal
status of an individual prior to providing assistance. However, in our view,
the provisions in Section 202 .. .would place parish, diocesan, and social
service program staff at risk of criminal prosecution simply for performing
their job.75
Although a House Judiciary Committee spokesman denies that this is the
intent of Section 202, and the Senate has yet to draft its own bill,76 both attorneys
and advocates are concerned about the vague scope of the House bill.77 One
attorney for migrants recently suggested that the law would criminalize even
71 NEw AM. MEDIA, supra note 5, at 1.
72 id.
73 H.R. 4437 provides that any person who
assists, encourages, directs, or induces a person to come to or enter the United States,
or to attempt to come to or enter the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of
the fact that such person is an alien who lacks lawful authority to come to or enter the
United States... [or] assists, encourages, directs, or induces a person to reside in or
remain in the United States, or to attempt to reside in or remain in the United States,
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such person is an alien who lacks
lawful authority to reside in or remain in the United States, or transports/moves,
harbors, conceals or shields, or conspires or attempts to do such acts will be
imprisoned for up to five years or fined if not for commercial gain, and for three to
twenty years for commercial gain.
H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §§ 274(a)(1)(A), (1)(C)-(G), (2) 1st Ses. (2005), 2005 CONG US HR 4437
(Westlaw).
74 Portillo, supra note 6, at 1.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 John Keller, Director, Immigrant Law Center, Minneapolis, MN, Statement to the Hamline
University Public Law Community (Mar. 14, 2006).
412 [Vol. 75:2
NO MORE DEA THS
attorneys' advice to undocumented clients about their rights to avoid deportation
or assistance in setting up businesses or gaining other legal protections.78
This characterization of humanitarians as criminals and the United States as
a vulnerable victim of potentially violent border crossers, and the forceful
determination of the United States government not to permit any exception to its
policy of rounding up and returning border crossers, 9 would strike any
knowledgeable border historian as deja vu. The Sanctuary movement of the
1980s also arose somewhat spontaneously in response to the rising flow of
Salvadoran immigrants to the United States, after the assassination of Archbishop
Oscar Romero and amid reports that Salvadoran death squads were kidnapping
and murdering Salvadoran citizens and Christian foreigners who had come to
work in their midst. 80 This history is instructive because of what it might portend
for the future escalation of the dispute between American humanitarian groups
and the United States government if some version of the House bill passes, or if
Congress or the President direct the Border Patrol to tighten the border
enforcement noose.
As in the current conflict, the motivations of fleeing Salvadorans were
complicated, though theirs was a more graphic and dire humanitarian disaster;
turmoil born of political dissenters' disappearances, civil war, and rising
economic emergency. Jesus Solorzano's deposition in the prosecution of John
Elder, a Sanctuary movement volunteer for his assistance to Salvadoran border
crossers, might be instructive. Solorzano testified that he fled El Salvador at a
time when thirty-three members of his family were being killed by the army.
81
One such fatality, a reluctantly appointed mayor, was killed with his wife,
children, mother-in-law and neighbor after he returned from the United States,82
possibly on a mission to testify about human rights abuses. To Solorzano's
knowledge, none of those killed had been a guerrilla.83 Solorzano, his father,
brothers and brother-in-law were driven from their lands by the government,
which forced a reduced-price sale to a government electronic company led by the
richest man in the country. 84 Solorzano suspected that his brother, who was
taken in the middle of the night by national guard forces, was killed because he
and the other landowners had demonstrated against this forced removal.8 5
78 Id.
79 Ironically, border crossers from countries other than Mexico arguably fare better. Because it is
not convenient to return these entrants to their home countries, they are often detained in the United
States for long periods, while Mexicans are promptly escorted back across the border. Rachel L.
Swarns, Tight Immigration Policy Hits Roadblock of Reality, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at A12,
available at 2006 WLNR 1081079.
80 Bedzek, supra note 17, at 916.
81 Deposition of Jesus Solorzano at 4-7, United States v. Elder, 601 F.Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985)
(No. B-84-276) (on file with author).
82 Id.
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Solorzano himself crossed the border into Los Angeles after two members
of the civilian patrol in his village warned him that the comandante of the patrol
had accused him of illegal activities.8 6 Only months before, on December 25,
1980, the army had entered his village, required all inhabitants to lie face-down
on the pavement for eight hours, and then began to take young people out of the
village to be murdered. On Christmas Day, they took thirty teenaged men, then
thirteen more the day after Christmas, and then four to five days later, thirty
young women because there were no more young men left. Solorzano testified,
"[t]wo days after the troops had came [sic] in, we went out looking for bodies
and we buried them, but we only found pieces of bodies, because the dogs had
eaten them away.
', 88
After he crossed the border, Solorzano's son was taken by the army from a
bus stop when Solorzano was in the United States. After the family went looking
for the son, the Human Rights Commission notified the family that he had been
found in the street and buried as an unknown, his head in a box of garbage, his
arms in another place, and the rest of his body in a third place.8 Virtually
Solorzano's entire community of 800 families left the area out of fear of the
government, and subsequently, the entire village was destroyed by the
government via bombings and raids.90
Responding to this turmoil were the volunteers of the Sanctuary movement,
who originally became involved by providing humanitarian assistance to fleeing
refugees-food and shelter by the parishioners of Sacred Heart Church in
Nogales, Arizona; advocacy for refugees arrested by the Border Patrol by people
like Quaker rancher Jim Corbett; prayer vigils outside the federal building by
Rev. John Fife and his barrio congregation, Southside Presbyterian Church;
Central American resettlement help by religious advocates like Sister Darlene
Nicgorski.9'
In Bezdek's account, the efforts of the Sanctuary movement turned toward
"illegal" assistance when the Border Patrol itself began to ramp up its "take no
prisoners" approach to border crossings by Salvadoran refugees. 2 While, in
1980, the INS would permit detainees to be released on their own recognizance if
they had a letter from a church promising to care for them, after President
Reagan's inauguration, the policy of the INS shifted to "a policy of mass,,93
detention and aggressive deportation. Finding detained Central Americans in
"deplorable conditions," Sanctuary workers made a valiant effort to raise money
86 id.
87 Id. at 9-15.881Id. at 19.
89 id.
90 Id. at 25-26.
91 Bezdek, supra note 17, at 919-21.
92 Id. at 910.
93 Id. at 921.
[Vol. 75:2
NO MORE DEA THS
to bail the Salvadorans out of jail, putting up their homes for bond and raising $1
million for bail within two weeks. 9
Yet, Bezdek writes, "the government's capacity to detain and deport
seemed boundless." 95 First, the government began to raise bail bonds to keep up
with the success of Sanctuary volunteers in bailing refugees out,96 as well as
pressuring Salvadorans to agree to voluntarily return home by threatening them
with continued detention if they did not pay bonds of $4000-$5000 for
themselves and each of their children.97 Moreover, the INS began to employ
other unsavory methods of persuasion and deception to get refugees to waive
their rights to due process and counsel.98 One attorney swore in her affidavit that
the Border Patrol advised refugees that "they would be better off signing a
voluntary return form than applying for asylum" since "asylum applications will
eventually be denied and that it is no use for the Salvadoran to wait in INS
detention for this eventuality." 99
During the Sanctuary movement period, detained families were often
separated in Tucson, some being held as far away as El Paso or Los Angeles,
and, as a tactic to seek voluntary return agreements, family members were rarely
informed where other members were taken.'t° Border Patrol workers rarely
advised refugees about how they could seek a bond or bond reduction, or of the
right to counsel, or even of the right to seek asylum.'0 ' Moreover, attorneys for
the immigrants, like Sanctuary workers, were convinced that asylum applicants
would rarely get fair and impartial consideration by the Immigration Office, with
many immigration judges not bothering to read the evidence submitted or
ignoring clear evidence of the likelihood of persecution.'
0 2
Responding to this mounting abuse of power, Sanctuary movement workers
"'did everything that [they] could think of to stop the deportations.9,' 03 Among
their "legal" responses to the crisis, they filed lawsuits to stop INS
misrepresentation and coercion of refugees.1"4 One such lawsuit, Orantes-
94 Id. at 921-22.
95 Id. at 922.
96 Id.
97 Affidavit of Suzanne Rabe, attorney at law, entered in United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574
(S.D. Tex. 1985) (No. B-84-276) (on file with author).
98 Bezdek, supra note 17, at 922.
99 Rabe affidavit, supra note 97, at 2.
'00 Id. at 3-4.
10' Id. at 2-3.
102 Id. at 4-5 (Rabe noted that, to her knowledge, the INS district director had granted only one
asylum application from August 1981 to May 1985. Rabe also indicated that in her first asylum
hearing, the immigration judge refused to allow her to make any motions, refused to record the
proceedings, and refused to go on with the hearing after she insisted on making a record. Another
judge refused to change venue to the area of the country where released immigrants were currently
living with friends or relatives, such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, or Washington D.C.).
103 Bezdek, supra note 17, at 923.
'04 Id. at 979.
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Hernadez v. Smith,105  successfully enjoined summary deportations of
Salvadorans, l°6 while other INS practices such as the transfer of aliens to
detention centers were upheld. 0 7 A Sanctuary movement lawsuit challenging the
INS failure to properly apply asylum law and customary international law for
refugees did not end until a 1991 settlement, providing that the stipulated class of
Salvadorans and Guatemalans would be given asylum hearings de novo. 108
Sanctuary movement workers also attempted to convince Congress to respond by
protecting Central American refugees, amending immigration enforcement laws,
and pushing home countries to curb existing abuses, but these efforts bore no
fruit at all until 1990.109
Because their legal efforts were not protecting Salvadorans from immediate
deportation, Sanctuary movement volunteers also turned to allegedly illegal
means, including holding their churches out as sanctuaries to fleeing refugees,
assisting refugees in crossing the border when they were found in the desert, and
helping these refugees on an "Underground Railroad" to a place of safety in the
United States or Canada." l0 In response, their churches were infiltrated by
government informants seeking information they could use to arrest movement
workers."' A number of volunteers were put on trial, including eleven persons
in United States v. Aguilar.'12  The Aguilar trial court not only denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss these indictments based on the government
informant's testimony and selective prosecution, but refused defenses of
international law, free exercise of religion, and necessity."3 Indeed, the Court
also refused all but two of the 126 jury instructions proposed by the defense and
virtually all witness testimony (including the testimony of the government's own
Central American witnesses) about the situation in El Salvador." 4 The Ninth
Circuit similarly dismissed the Sanctuary volunteers' religious conscience
arguments, as did the Fifth Circuit in prosecutions of Stacey Merkt and Jack
Elder in Texas.' 5
The political moral of the story, especially in light of recent Congressional
legislation, is that this standoff could well happen again-and once again,
between persons torn by their conscientious duty to save lives and an intractable
government intent on enforcing the letter of the law, and indeed, going beyond
'0' 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
106 Bezdek, supra note 17, at 979.
107 Id. at 979-80.
'0' Id. at 980.
109 Id. (noting that in 1990, immigration laws were amended to allow the Attorney General to
provide temporary protected status to certain classes of people from other nations).
"0 Id. at 933-37.
... See id. at 917.
112 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989).
11 Bezdek, supra note 17, at 952-55.
141d at 956-57.
.. Id. at 958-62, 963-65 (noting that the Fifth Circuit recast Elder and Merkt as "stubborn
supplicants for a 'free-exercise haven"' who chose "'confrontational, illegal means to practice their
religious views."').
[Vol. 75:2
NO MORE DEA THS
the letter to ensure that no discovered immigrants escape the immigration
dragnet. Already, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee on
Migration have urged their employees to continue to provide humanitarian
assistance that would potentially be illegal under the new Act, while disclaiming
any intent to encourage violation of immigration laws.' 16
For purposes of this article's focus on conscience, it is important that we
note how these volunteers have responded to a tragedy in a much different way
than so many other Americans who consider themselves good people; by risking
imprisonment to save lives. In a complicated political situation, a maelstrom
involving terrorism, drug trafficking, and profound economic implications for
border states and employers who hire "illegals" alike, we might ask these
volunteers to defend their conscientious choice to disobey the lawful authorities
who also go into the desert and rescue crossers, only to send them right back to
their miserable lives.
III. UNPACKING THE WORKINGS OF CONSCIENCE IN MORAL
DECISION-MAKING: THEOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVES TO JUSTICE
SCALIA'S ANARCHIC MAN.
In adjudging whether conscientious disobedients should be treated the same
as immigration coyotes for legal, political and moral purposes, we need to
identify with more depth and specificity how the human conscience actually
operates to determine if there exists some distinction between the coyote's
justification for his actions and our disobedients' actions. If the conscience is
trustworthy, then when it determines to violate the law, it deserves a strong level
of deference, perhaps akin to the Sherbert v. Verner"7 strict scrutiny analysis
denied to immigration humanitarians in cases such as Merkt." 8 If, by contrast,
the conscience is largely untrustworthy, then Justice Scalia's view that the law
should not permit individuals to govern themselves by a standard not applied to
others seems more correct.
At the outset, we might reject some trivialized versions of human
conscience that have given solace to lawmakers seeking easy answers. In
holding these volunteers morally accountable for what they do, we might easily
reject behaviorist claims-against the American intuition that people are morally
responsible-that these volunteers are preprogrammed by their history or
psychology to make the choices that they do. 19 The behaviorist account would
make the coyote and the volunteer morally equivalent, for neither knows what he
does, nor why. Furthermore, there is no point in asking the question whether the
volunteer's conscience is telling all of us something about the moral truth of the
situation in the Arizona desert.
116 See Portillo, supra note 6, at 2.
"l 374 U.S. at 398.
98 4 F.2d at 950.
119 See, e.g., WAYNE C. BooTH, MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSENT 12, 50-52 (1974).
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Identifying disobedient-suspicious jurists' assumptions about how the
human conscience works is more complicated. The Fifth Circuit in the Merkt
and Elder prosecutions 120 describes this suspicion by casting the Sanctuary
workers as asking for a free pass from laws that do not personally suit them. In
Merkt, Judge Edith Hollan Jones wrote for the Court of Appeals that there are no
"free exercise havens"' 21 from criminal laws, which
have been enforced against pleas for preferment based on "free exercise."
The basis for these decisions was the conclusion that "the very concept of
ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards
on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.
Enforcement of [the law criminalizing transportation or assistance to illegal
border crossers] cannot ... brook exceptions for those who claim to obey a
higher authority."
[Merkt and her co-defendants] chose confrontational, illegal means to
practice their religious views-the 'burden' was voluntarily assumed and not
imposed on them by government. 121
In this account, four key assumptions need to be highlighted. First, Judge
Jones assumes that the disobedients are "creating" standards for themselves out
of whole cloth, rather than responding to a tradition of morality which they have
assumed as descendants and recipients of distinct religious and/or secular moral
histories and cultures. It is not clear why she assumes that the Sanctuary workers
"made up" their standards of conduct. Ironically, Judge Jones' reference to every
person who makes "his own standards" is a quotation from the passage of
Wisconsin v. Yoder, in which the Court explicitly distinguishes the private,
philosophical and idiosyncratic views of the Thoreaus of the world, isolated by
themselves at Walden Pond, from those who stand in a clear religious tradition
and thereby are deserving of the Free Exercise protection afforded the plaintiffs
in that case.
123
Second, and closely tied to the previous assumption, Judge Jones assumes
that a disobedient has a fully free choice about whether to obey or not obey the
law, that her choice is not constrained by either her own place in her tradition or
any "reality" about truth or good that might be present in the universe. The
immigration humanitarian "chooses" and "voluntarily assumes" the choice to
120 794 F.2d at 950. (Elder was also a defendant.).
21 Id. at 954.
122 Id. at 955-56 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
123 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (noting
if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection
of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau
rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their
claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and
personal .... ).
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violate the law, as if she is choosing ice cream or a mate. In Judge Jones' moral
universe, truth and good are apparently contingent, relative, and certainly not
"real" in the sense that the material world is real. In her moral universe, the need
of the other imposes no duty upon us, not even to speak of any divine demand for
moral behavior.
Third, Judge Jones casts suspicion on the credibility or honesty of
disobedients, suggesting that they "claim to" obey a higher authority, while
casting no such aspersions on the Border Patrol and government that prosecutes
them. Indeed, in Judge Jones' view, the Border Patrol is protecting the "peace,
order, and very existence of society.' ' 24 It is not clear why Judge Jones believes
that the Sanctuary workers only "claim to" obey a higher authority. It is not clear
whether she is suggesting that no person could possibly know whether a higher
authority mandated her behavior, thus casting doubt on the possibility of
determining moral truth, or whether we should believe such a person is lying.
Finally, Judge Jones' opinion that conscientious disobedients are asking for
"preference" over other citizens, suggests that they are receiving some kind of
windfall in being able to disobey the law. One might understand why judges or
citizens might suspect that about, for example, the Amish who refuse to pay
Social Security taxes for their employees, 2 5 or draftees who want to be exempted
from wartime service. 2 6 However, it is difficult to imagine how Judge Jones--or
any contemporary federal judge--could imagine that Sanctuary workers who are
giving up their homes, their savings, their safety and even risking their freedom
to drive out in the desert to save others' lives are worthy of "suspicion" that they
are seeking a social preference not accorded to others.
Justice Scalia later echoes some of Judge Jones' assumptions about
disobedients in Employment Division v. Smith.12  Quoting Reynolds v. United
States, he recites, "'[c]an a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of
his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of
124 Merkt, 794 F.2d at 955.
125See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denying Amish employers the right to
exempt themselves from paying Social Security taxes for employees based on their conscientious
belief in their responsibility to care for their own). It is noteworthy that in Lee, the Court does not
cast suspicion on the motives of the Amish, assuming that they are seeking to achieve a financial
windfall by exempting themselves from the tax, but rather rests its argument on the difficulty of
granting a multitude of tax exemptions to other groups. Id. at 259.
126 See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455 (1971) (though the Court in that case went
beyond the assumption that uniformity was needed to prohibit fraud, noting
it is not at all obvious in theory what sorts of objections should be deemed sufficient
to excuse an objector, and there is considerable force in the Government's contention
that a program of excusing objectors to particular wars may be 'impossible to conduct
with any hope of reaching fair and consistent results .... To view the problem of
fairness and evenhanded decision-making, in the present context, as merely a
commonplace chore of weeding out 'spurious claims,' is to minimize substantial
difficulties of real concern to a responsible legislative body.).
Id.
12 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every
citizen to become a law unto himself.''1 28 In selecting this quote, Justice Scalia
affirms Judge Jones' view by suggesting that disobedient citizens are asking for a
separate set of laws to be applied to themselves, and intimating that dissenting
citizens are asking to "relieve themselves" from their duties as citizens, to
"excuse themselves" from complying with laws that burden others.1 29
Justice Scalia's blithe reference, which embraces the Supreme Court's
imprimatur of government persecution leveled against the Latter Day Saints,
130
reflects his acceptance of what those who have written about the public/private or
fact/value have termed a division between rationalist and expressivist views of
moral judgment.13 ' Wayne C. Booth famously described the tenets of this
"modem dogma" in ways that virtually track Judge Jones' assumptions: because
our actions are driven by deep motives, there are no defensible reasons for moral
action or choice; 132 the world is coldly impersonal and indifferent to human
values; 133 and the "truth" is better to be found by suspicion of others' hidden
motives and claimed "reality" than by assent to the truth proposed by others. 1
34
Judge Jones' and Justice Scalia's assumptions play to one side of the
rationalist/expressivist dialogue in modem social ethics. This debate assumes
that public decisions will be governed by rationality and objectivity, while
private "moral" decisions will be governed by emotion and intuition, and that
neither type of moral choice belongs in the "realm" of the other.' 35 It is properly
called the fact/value or public/private "split" because it assumes a schizophrenic
moral imagination, which changes its nature, as it should, depending on what
kind of judgment is at stake. As public rationalists, Sellz and Strauss are
.2 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)).
129 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (citing Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95
(1940)); Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
130 Like Scalia's dissent in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648 (1996), which famously and
scandalously invokes Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (a case which justified the stripping of
the basic rights of citizenship of LDS members because of their church's stance on polygamy),
Scalia's invocation of Reynolds in the Smith case represented neither good law-for the
belief/action distinction has been clearly superseded since Sherbert-nor good rhetoric, given the
Reynolds courts' clear bias against LDS members for their religious views on marriage.
131 See, e.g., BooT, supra note 119, at 23. Booth described scientismic (rationalist) assumptions
that "[t]here are no good reasons for changing [one's] mind" about values; the mind is nothing but
a chemical operation; "[t]he universe is inherently impersonal, indifferent to all human values";
"[t]ruth is found primarily by critical doubt," and the purpose of trying to change anyone's mind is
to make one's self-interested desires triumph. Irrationalists (expressivists), by contrast, believe
"[t]he heart has reasons that the reason ignores," that the mind is a subordinate and limiting factor
in one's total being; that the mind can kill the spirit and its drive for truth, and that the rational
universe is impersonal such that I must assert my personal values in dissent and release my
creativity in expression, and that rational truth is trivial. Id. at 23-24.
132 Id. at 24.
113 Id. at 50-51.
134 Id. at 57-58.
13 See, e.g., id. at 14-20 (describing the battle between scientismic and irrationalist forces on how
things can be known).
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assumed to have virtually unlimited moral freedom, and we should be able to
expect that their choices to act in the matters concerning the public realm,
including law, will and should be fully rationalized, well-informed and based on
"objective" facts rather than opinions or intuitions. 36
For Justice Scalia, apparently, conscientious disobedients, acting on the
basis of religious or moral concerns, are improperly using their "personal," (not
communally-based) irrational, "private sphere" emotions and intuitions to make
public judgments about whether they should obey the law instead of relying on
community determinations, presumably rationally based and embodied in
statutory law. Their statements are not truth-claims but personal views held in a
value-indifferent world. Alternatively, Scalia may be a pure positivist democrat,
suggesting that all political decisions are irrational and expressivist, and that
majority rule is justified by nothing else but the fact of a majority, a foundational
if not morally defensible tenet of American government.
37
One might usefully contrast the simple "either/or" of the
rationalist/expressivist view of moral decision-making with more complex
medieval and Reformation understandings of how the conscience works. At least
some of the scholastics followed Aristotle and Aquinas in locating the conscience
within the intellectual or rational side of man's nature, a "remnant of [his]
original uncorrupted nature."'' 38 Many of them, as did the early Luther, thought
that conscience accurately described to individuals the good that they were
morally bound to, even though a stubborn human will could dissent from the
judgment of the conscience and consciously choose evil. 139 In making judgments
about the rightness of a particular act-whether Sellz and Strauss, coming upon
some dying migrants should pick them up and take them to the hospital, for
example-these scholastics suggested that the conscience worked according to a
sort of syllogism. What they termed the synteresis of the conscience contained
the "major oremise" of the syllogism; it held the moral precepts that guide human
wellbeing,' the notions that we should care for others and not harm them.
Then, the workings of practical reasoning, or the syneidesis, would utilize those
major premises about the good to judge what particular actions the person should
engage in (or refuse to do) given the context, or to make a judgment on whether
another person's actions were good or evil.
14 1
At the risk of oversimplifying and overstating a complicated debate, the
later Luther contributed to a more holistic understanding of the workings of the
136 Id. at 16-17.
137 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (noting that the "consequence of democratic government must be
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs").
'31 See MICHAEL BAYLOR, ACTION AND PERSON: CONSCIENCE IN LATE SCHOLASTICISM AND THE
YOUNG LUTHER 47-49, 130-31 (1977).
139 Id. at 131.
140 Id. at 131-32, 134-35. See also CHARLES E. CURRAN, Conscience in the Light of the Catholic
Moral Tradition, in CONSCIENCE 6-7, 25-27 (2004) (Charles Curran, ed.) (also discussing synteresis
as human awareness of personal responsibility and syneidesis as the effort to make judgments).
141 BAYLOR, supra note 138, at 131.
2006]
UMKC LAW REVIEW
conscience. He suggested that the conscience worked in a morally complex way
not at all reflected in the court opinions that discuss it. Speaking about a
"twofold or double synteresis,"' 42 Luther understood the synteresis as an element
of both cognitive and affective sides of human nature, of the reason as well as the
will and emotions.1 43 In that way, as suggested, his views contrasted with most
in the scholastic tradition who understood the synteresis to be located only in the
rational aspect of human nature,' 44 as well as with theologians like the Franciscan
St. Bonaventura, who thought that the synteresis was only found in the affective
or volitional part of human nature.
45
That is, Luther assumed that just as an individual "has some innate
knowledge of God and of the first principles of morality, so too man has an
inherent desire to do good; he is naturally inclined to seek or choose that which
he perceives as good."'4 Indeed, Luther frequently equated the conscience with
the "heart" rather than the mind. 47 This view that conscience was located in
both cognition and affection is critical because it gives lie to the assumption that
what some might term our moral "impulses" are likely to be selfish and morally
untrustworthy, a theme resonant in Justice Scalia's view.
Moreover, Luther's understanding of the conscience also attacks the
assumptions of the "rationalist" side of the moral reasoning divide, which jurists
utilize to reject disobedients' claims. Essentially, many such jurists assume that
community judgments, such as those embodied in law, will reflect disinterested,
"purely rational" and empirically based decision-making about the moral good.1
48
They effectively assume (not unlike the scholastics) that the rational aspects of
human thought are well-informed by conscience, especially as compared with
"the will" or the affective aspects of moral response which are likely to be
untrustworthy.
49
By contrast to this view, Luther recognized that original sin affected both
reason and will-within both reason and will, good and evil were constantly
contending with each other. 50 In Luther's view, because cognition as much as
will is affected by human evil, all conclusions that the rational mind reaches,
even those that begin with correct "major premises" of the synteresis, have to be
regarded as just as suspect as any refusal of the will to act upon what the rational
mind has identified as good.151 Thus, Justice Scalia's instinct that the conscience
should be suspected is not entirely displaced. Even if our conscientious
disobedient seems to be able to lay out a logically defensible reason for his
choice to violate the law, we should be just as concerned about his rational
141 Id. at 157.
143 Id.
144 id.
145 Id. at 28.
'46Id. at 157.
141 Id. at 172.
141 See Merkt, 794 F.2d at 955.
149 Id.
50 Id. at 159-60, 180-81.
151 Id.
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claims as we are about his affective or intuitive inclination to disobey. In
Luther's view, we should be as suspicious that the disobedient has manipulated
his own moral reasoning, even unwittingly, to support his own agenda (including
his interest in seeing himself a good person, like the humanitarian) as we are
concerned that a law violator will know the right and still not choose to do it (like
the coyote).
Again, however, the insight that good and evil are constantly contending for
position in both reason and will did not eliminate, for Luther, the reality that the
soul was inclined to good actions. 52 That reality simply made it impossible to
suggest that any internal or external manifestation of human thought--e.g.,
rational assessment, the will to act, or the action itself-was untainted by sin. In
a graphic and overly pessimistic summary, Luther argued that the good within
the human conscience is simply a "tiny motion toward God .... [L]ook at the
whole man full of concupiscence which is not obstructed by this tiny motion."'
' 53
These two insights-that what we call the conscience is operating in what
we know, in what we feel, and in what we choose to do, and that evil and good
are constantly contending as part of this process-led Luther to explain how the
conscience functions to produce guilt for past actions. When the human desire
for good is coupled with the recognition that we are somewhat morally free to
consent to that good or to refuse, we can recognize, at least when our minds are
not focused on justifying our behavior as good, when a sinful choice to act or
refuse to act has been made, producing a sense of guilt. 5 4 For Luther, then,
conscience condemns all forms of human action designed to avoid the need for
the mercy of God. It condemns "good people," those who are sincerely trying to
obey the moral law and whose actions reflect their piety, helping them to realize
that neither their sincerity nor their actions can be counted as worthy given the
countless choices they make not to do the good. 5  The conscience also
condemns those who mistakenly believe that they are acting for good in the
world, whether their errors are vincible or invincible, 156 bringing home to them
the poor outcomes of their feeble attempts at goodness. Finally, it judges those
who know that they are doing evil. In this account, Strauss and Sellz, the Border
'1
2 Id. at 175.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 169. This also led him to turn away from an understanding of the synteresis as a location
for the possibility that the human being could know and do the good, e.g., a theory of works-
righteousness. Id. at 178. For the latter Luther, then, the focus of the conscience was on the
consequent action of the conscience, and its action on condemning the whole person, not judging
particular acts. The synteresis retained, at best, ethical but certainly not soteriological significance.
Id. at 184.
15 5 Id. at 184.
156Traditional Catholic theology has traditionally distinguished between vincible or culpable errors
of moral judgment, cases in which the person has made a moral mistake due to negligence, where
the conscience should not be followed; and invincible errors, mistakes that occur despite the
person's best efforts to understand the truth, where the conscience should be followed even to an
erroneous end. CuRRAN, supra note 140, at 4-5.
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Patrol, and the coyotes, as well as the judges who seal their fate, are all similarly
condemned by the conscience.
While Luther's account of the condemning conscience shows it as a
defining moment for salvation, because it is essential before a person comes to
rely on the mercy of God, 157 his account makes it truly difficult for persons of
faith to know when they can trust their own assessments of what is morally
required of them. That has a surprising two-fold result in terms of the question of
the conscientious disobedient. On one hand, it means that persons of faith who
are proposing to violate the law will never really know whether either their moral
intuitions or their reasoned conclusions are sound, or merely attempts to justify
themselves before God. Conversely, it also means that persons of faith,
confronted with a situation of moral urgency that seems to call for disobedience,
will never know whether their intuition or moral judgment that they should keep
the law is a choice validly informed by the synteresis. The moral decision to
obey the law and turn aside from human need may be just as infected with self-
interest and self-rationalization--the reality that we would rather not put our
lives and fortunes on the line for others dressed up in the guise of good
citizenship.
Luther, unfortunately, elides this problem. He argues that good works will
follow from faith, not because a Christian's reasoning or intuitions suddenly
become pure by faith, for Christians remain fully sinners. Rather, he believes
that morally good action will flow from the Christian's faith like an unstoppable
river, welling up naturally in response to the need of the neighbor.
158
In an anthropology that suggests we are simultaneously good and evil, that
there is no human being not still living a life of partial self-absorption and self-
delusion, there would seem to be no clarity on the question of whether a
conscientious disobedient's response is the overflow of faith active in love or the
rationalization of a sin-infected conscience. To a sincere conscience trying to
decide whether to disobey a secular law, thus might pose a dilemma. The terrible
judgment of the conscience would seem to freeze the disobedient into inaction,
for any moral good would seem insufficient to the overwhelming need he
perceives, and any "good motives" for his action would be suspect.
A traditional legal solution to this problem is to borrow a denuded and
distorted version of Luther's "two governances" doctrine that masquerades in
modem discussions as the fact/value or public/private split previously
discussed. 159 At the bottom of current jurisprudential judgments such as that, the
157See BAYLOR, supra note 138, at 123-25.
158 Id. at 246-48; GEORGE W. FORELL, FAiTH ACTIVE IN LOVE, 85-87, 109 (1954).
159 More traditionally referred to as the "two-kingdoms" doctrine, the doctrine argues that God
exercises a two-fold simultaneous governance in the world-God's "right hand" governance of the
world, saving sinners through the Cross, brings about our ultimate salvation, and God's "left-hand"
governance, which participates with human beings in ordering the affairs of this world. For Luther,
a key mistake of the Roman church was to conflate the two govemances instead of understanding
the parallel, but radically different, ways in which God participates in human history and the story
of salvation. For a discussion of misinterpretations of the two kingdoms doctrine, see GEORGE W.
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No More Deaths prosecution is the assumption that morality and religious
belief-that is, the judgments of the conscience-must be consigned to the
private voluntary sphere where law does not operate. In this view, disobedience
has improperly brought what is private into the public sphere in challenge to the
law. On the other hand, the response of government, whether it is the Border
Patrol official deciding whether to arrest a No More Deaths worker or a judge
adjudicating his First Amendment claim, must be based on "objective" grounds
like law, not "personal" grounds like morality. In this solution to the problem
posed by individual conscience, the government's view, in effect, says:
Do what you must to save your soul, and do what your conscience judges in
your private life where the law does not interfere. But in the 'real' world, we
expect you to obey the law or take the consequences if you do not, just as any
other lawbreaker. Because in the 'real world,' we have no choice-we have
to respond to all law-breaking actions equally, regardless of what moral
situation claims them and how.
For a Christian or for another religious believer who accepts Luther's
account of the relationship of the good to conscience, however, the rationalist
view of public life misunderstands the nature of reality. There is no "private"
world to which the demand to love one's neighbor is confined. Rather, the
demand of the Law writ large governs every aspect of human existence,
including so-called secular lawmaking and law enforcement. That a state is
secular does not mean that the state is out from under the moral demands of the
law-it simply means that the Church, ordained to spread the Good News, has no
business assuming the jurisdiction granted by the Creator to orders like the
household and the state. If Shanti Sellz and Daniel Strauss are rightly convinced
that love for the neighbor means rescuing immigrants in the desert without
sending them back immediately to a desolate existence, so the Congress and the
President should be convinced, and should not send them back.
The current regime involving conscience, however, suggests that a
believer's conviction about the moral demands of the law must be reinforced by
external authority before it is worthy of credence by the state. In pre-Smith
jurisprudence, that authority may be the Church. For example, a conscientious
dissenter, like Yoder who refused to send his children to high school, or Sherbert
who refused to work on her Sabbath, was more likely to prevail if she could show
her conformity with the institutional demands of her religion. 60 In post-Smith
jurisprudence, however, the only authority that can justify the dissenter's
disobedience to the law is the state. The grant of an exemption to pacifists from
conscription laws, or to peyotists from drug laws, is dependent upon the states'
FORELL, Luther's Conception of the 'Natural Orders," in 2 WORD & WORLD SUPPLEMENT SERIES
67-69 (William R. Russell ed., 1994).
160 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16 (distinguishing the Amish claim as "one of deep religious
conviction, shared by an organized group" with a merely personal preference or subjective
evaluation of community values); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402 n. 1 (noting, "[N]or is there any doubt
that the prohibition against Saturday labor is a basic tenet of the Seventh-day Adventist creed,
based upon that religion's interpretation of the Holy Bible.").
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willingness to enshrine such an exemption in statutory law. 16 1 For Justice Scalia,
the objectively expressed preferences of a democratic majority-in statutory
law-outweigh the conscientious demands of the minority. It may not be clear
whether that is because he believes that public moral decision-making is based on
better data and reasoning than private decision-making (accepting the rationalist
view) or because he believes that conscience is merely a taste or a preference.
However, the result is the same: there is no practical way that state actors can
distinguish between the moral demands of a No More Deaths volunteer and the
selfish choices of a coyote or drug smuggler.
While Justice Scalia's solution seems elegantly simple and egalitarian, it
constitutes a form of judicial, as well as legislative and executive, willful
blindness to the moral nature of human existence. The decision of the Sanctuary
judges-much like the decision of today's Border Patrol and their superiors-L-to
return illegal immigrants to death or certain suffering, implies that human
existence does not have a moral dimension to which moral persons must pay
heed. They either pretend not to notice, like Justice Scalia, or refuse to
recognize, like Judge Jones, that there is any legal import from the lessons of
history that human institutions are as infected with sin as individual human
beings. They refuse to grapple, even rhetorically and even as a dissenting
critique, with the reality that majorities and governments will justify the pursuit
of their own interests under the guise of moral policy, because they are human
institutions, just as much as any law-disobedient will be prone to self-
justification.
Indeed, Luther's insight was that those institutions most entrusted by God
and human beings with human welfare-the church, the state, the family-are
most likely to be the loci where sinful, self-interested, and self-justifying
behavior will get out of control. For in his view, the Devil exists, and the Devil
naturally works hardest at turning away the heart of those in institutions most
entrusted with the preservation of human community and human salvation.
Thus, the "received tradition" or "common wisdom," handed down within
community or enshrined in institutional rules, is even more likely to reflect evil
161 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (noting that
[v]alues that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in
the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process. Just as a society
that believes in the negative protection accorded to the press by the First Amendment
is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word,
so also a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief
can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well .... But to say
that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is
desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate
occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that
leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage
those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable
consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.).
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as to correct the evil of individuals bent on being "a law unto themselves." It
suffices only to mention briefly some obvious examples of well-rationalized
institutions backed by textual and traditional authority-the Nazi state, human
slavery and women's oppression, just for starters-to show that evil and
oppression is not countered or cured by governments or institutions, but rather is
exponentially magnified by such.
The question then remains how government institutions can respond
appropriately to the reality that majoritarian decisions probably deserve less,
rather than more, moral deference, because they are less likely than individual
moral decisions to reflect the demands of the good. The academic battle which
usually ensues at this moment of recognition is one over separation of powers.
What is a competent and constitutionally authorized court to do in the face of a
majority's decision either to oppress, or more frequently, to turn a blind eye to
human suffering? This debate, while constitutionally interesting, has not begun
to address the suffering caused by this constitutional stalemate.
IV. ACCEPTING THE CONSCIENCE AS PUBLIC
As I have suggested, moral reality cannot be, and should not be, ignored by
legal institutions or actors, particularly the moral realities that face the United
States as a result of the flood of illegal immigration. If all individuals, no matter
their positions, personal integrity, or religious commitments, are likely to make
judgments affecting public life that are tainted by self-interest, indifference, even
bigotry or meanness, then a democratic polity that hopes to have any moral
credibility must create institutional structures that account for this reality in
hearing claims of conscientious dissenter communities.
Of course, not all dissenters are demanding a moral engagement with the
state and the American polity. Many of those claiming Free Exercise exemptions
are indeed arguing for a separate status for themselves and their religious
communities alone, to be free from the constraints and responsibilities that define
the lives of other citizens, such as the Amish request. 62 Some are asking for a
very limited relief from a generally applicable law that imposes a particular
burden on them alone, in light of their religious beliefs, such as Native American
Church members asking for exemption from criminal drug laws because peyote
is sacred to them. 6 3 Moreover, there will invariably be cases in which a religious
community is demanding an accommodation which concededly causes harm to
specific individuals rather than claimed harm to the national economy or social
life as a whole, such as religious cults who want to engage in universally
recognized malum in se behavior, such as abuse of children. But in many
contemporary cases of disobedience, religious citizens are asking the state and
the polity to change federal or state policy in order to reflect moral good in cases
162 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-21 (noting that an exemption could be sought from a valid
uniformly applicable law).
163 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (1990) (noting that Smith sought an exemption that was concededly
applicable to non-Native American Church users).
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where there is no serious conflict over ultimate ends, but rather over the morality
of means. For these cases, a political structure that recognizes that these are
public moral demands upon us all is required.
Any such political structure needs to be able to interrogate both the private
individual and agents of the state exercising claims that their actions are morally
valid. That interrogation must have a two-fold consciousness. On one hand, the
institution must be hospitable to claims brought to it, requiring the assumption
that either the state or the individual may be raising valid moral arguments and
making wise moral choices in good faith. At the same time, the institution must
possess the competence and authority to question whether the claims of the
disobedient or the claims of the state are infected with self-interest of some kind.
Such an institution must be able to gather facts that go beyond the confines of a
narrow legal case, facts that reflect the reality of government policy on individual
lives and not just statistical trends, if any semblance of moral judgment is to be
retained. Similarly, such an institution must have the mechanisms to ask both the
disobedient and the state whether they have explored feasible options that might
cause the crisis of disobedience against the state to dissipate. It must also be able
to propose options for defusing that crisis.
However, as the Sanctuary movement and its contemporary successor
sharply illustrate, the institution most clearly charged with engaging moral reality
in the development of United States law-the Congress-is perhaps most ill-
equipped to respond to that challenge. In the unlikely event that a sea-change in
U.S. immigration policy obviates the need for a humanitarian response to illegal
border crossings, Congress' inability and refusal to deal with dissenter
movements still needs attention. After all, this movement is not the only such
concerted movement to claim moral authority to violate federal or state law for
the sake of saving lives. A few examples are: the anti-nuclear movement which
resulted in a number of prosecutions,' 64 the protests against Central American
policy that resulted in illegal demonstrations in the 1980s, 165 and the abortion
clinic picketing movement.
Students of Congress could develop a lengthy and sophisticated laundry list
of the reasons for Congressional failure to adequately respond to widespread
conscientious dissenter movements in the United States. I will suggest, in
164 Charles R. DiSalvo, Necessity's Child: The Judiciary, Disobedience and the Bomb, 41 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 911, 920 (1987) (noting that "since 1980, when the 'Plowshares Eight' entered a General
Electric facility in eastern Pennsylvania to hammer on the components of a Mark-12 re-entry
vehicle and spill blood on the builders' blueprints, there have been more than a dozen other direct
attacks on the bomb").
165 See, e.g., United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2980
(1992) (denying necessity defense in sit-in in Congressman's office in protest of U.S. policy in El
Salvador and Central America).
166 See, e.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Applying Penalty Enhancements to Civil Disobedience:
Clarifying the Free Speech Clause Model to Bring the Social Value of Political Protest into the
Balance, 59 O-o ST. L.J. 185, 238-39 (1998) (listing protests against abortion clinics as well as
civil disobedience involving civil rights, anti-war activism, environmentalism, animal rights, and
gay rights).
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passing, only three of the possible reasons. First and perhaps most obviously,
there is the sheer immensity of that body's responsibilities: in a global world
where terrorism, war, looming deficits, and critical domestic programs compete
for attention, the outcry of a few humanitarians about people dying in the desert
is most unlikely to be attended in the halls of legislative power.
Second, while Congress has developed investigatory powers to deal with
emergencies of national scope, such as the Hurricane Katrina disaster, Congress
has not traditionally evinced much interest in exploring in depth, or with much
persistence, the effects of its economic, social, and political policies upon lives of
individual campesinos who risk everything to cross the border. Even as
Congress has been dragged into policy changes to ameliorate the most egregious
human rights abuses, as in El Salvador, other refugee emergencies have cropped
up. Local officials who presumably are in a better position to experience and
assess these effects are caught in a political vise between government workers
and private citizens reeling from the effects of massive immigration
unaccompanied by federal resources, nationalists who are ideologically opposed
to immigration, and those who would extend humanitarian aid to these refugees.
Perhaps more importantly for this argument, however, Congress has largely
resolved the question of whether it is going to be a "democratic" body, whose
actions are shaped by coalitions of like-minded citizens pursuing their own self-
interest, rather than a "republican body," in which legislators put aside self-
interest to debate the public good, in favor of a democratic model. As such,
Congressional debates about the morality of the federal government's laws and
policies, more often than not, take a back seat to debates about the efficacy of
those policies in achieving non-moral goods about which there is presumed to be
a consensus. There are, no doubt, many sound reasons for Congress to focus on
efficiency, fairness and other such values rather than the intrinsic morality of
their actions. However, the result of those decisions leaves a large void in
government leadership, at least over public conversation about the common
good, what is morally required to achieve it, and where the United States has
failed to conform to its own moral ideals. As the humanitarian immigration
movements show, the church is one place where that conversation can occur, but
it is not a commonly recognized ground in a religiously diverse polity. Thus,
there is currently no "place" to have such a conversation.
The result of this void in moral deliberation at a national level is
Congressional reinforcement of Justice Scalia's apparent view that conscience is
a "private" matter that is all well and good, so long as it stays in its place and
does not make a challenge to existing law. Indeed, such a view would be
particularly attractive to the lawmaker: it is never the king who wants to have
truth spoken to him after he has exercised his power. It would be difficult to find
the Congressperson who would be willing to admit publicly that the democratic
ideal-a legislative body that takes the time to listen to everyone and explore
every facet of a political problem-does not work in practice. If only for
symbolic reasons, the Emperor cannot admit to his lack of clothes.
For Americans, however, conscience must be a public matter, if for no other
reason than that the Constitution enshrines a role for conscience in our political
life in the First Amendment Speech and Religion Clauses. While the role of
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Speech Clause dissenters in enriching our political and social life is a truism-
any law student can recite the self-government, safety valve, and checking
rationales for the clause-an equal acknowledgement of the institutional role of
the Free Exercise Clause in our system of government has been at best
understated in modern times. 167 The consignment of matters of conscience to a
private, expressivist role has been largely accompanied by the identification of
Free Exercise concerns exclusively as a negative liberty provision designed to
allow minorities to be "left alone" in the exercise of their religion by majorities.
In the popular imagination about the Free Exercise Clause, religious dissenters
have come to be known as "odd people"-the Amish, Jehovah's Witnesses, Hare
Krishnas, atheists-who are to be tolerated because their consciences compel
them to be different, rather than citizens who may have something to teach us all
about our common life. That portrayal is a portent for disaster for a super-power
that, Madison and others have consistently reminded us, can be counted on to
abuse its power the more its competitors fade from view.
To understand that conscience is a public matter and not private, irrational
individual emotion or sentiment of isolated groups of "do-gooders" is to
recognize that dialogue of power with dissent is an essential constituent of a
public moral community. It is not necessary to imagine some ideal dialogical
community where all individual citizens are accorded equal respect for their
moral and political views and equal liberty to carry them out to see the necessity
of group dialogue between governments and dissenting communities. Even the
political realist can understand that the morally unresponsive government can
provoke, on one hand, an Orange revolution, 16 or on the other, citizen disgust
and apathetic withdrawal from the political process.
167 Many who have made this argument see the Free Exercise Clause as a limitation on government
power, somewhat like the jurisdictional limits that the Constitution imposes on each branch of
government. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on
Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1998) (noting: "[I]n contrast, the task of a structural
clause is to manage [the political power of the] sovereign." If the Establishment Clause is
structural, it would lay down a power-limiting restraint on the scope of government.); Carl. H.
Esbeck, Religion and the First Amendment: Some Causes of Recent Confusion, 42 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 883 (2001); Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus
Equality, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 7,23-24 (1993) (noting
[t]he Es.ablishment Clause prevents ultimate truth (or those who believe they know it)
from impinging too directly upon both government those who may not share that
understanding of the truth. The Free Exercise Clause prevents the government from
impinging upon the ultimate truth of the believer .... [T]he religion clauses are
prominent as one of very few provisions in the Constitution which clearly support
mediating institutions.).
168 The Orange Revolution of 2004-05 was a series of protests and political events in the Ukraine in
response to corruption, voter intimidation and 2004 electoral fraud. In response to these protests,
the Ukrainian courts ordered a new election and the opposition candidate was elected. See Orange
Revolution, WKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orange_Revolution (last visited March 24,
2006).
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Apart from those extremes, however, conscientious disobedients play a
variety of important roles in keeping our civic life true to our national ideas. For
example, like the immigration humanitarians, these disobedients keep in view the
tragic realities that are the consequence of national policies. If nothing else, they
force us to acknowledge that the consequences of national policies are not
unalloyed goods, but often contain tragic dimensions that harm real persons,
whether it is the tragic dimension that accompanies the exclusion of needy aliens,
or a decision not to rebuild New Orleans as it was before Hurricane Katrina.
Without recognition of these tragic choices, the ability of our political
community to exercise its powers humbly and carefully, with recognition of its
limitations and the consequences of the exercise of power, is severely
constrained.
Second, disobedients can call to national public attention localized
injustices that local communities either cannot see, because they participate in
and benefit from the injustices, or do not know about, because they are living
their business-as-usual lives rather than surveying their communities for want or
injustice. While the media play some part in bringing these realities to public
light, their attention is largely focused upon the immediate controversies that
make for traditional news stories, controversies that conscientious disobedients
can stir up through their dissenting behavior, both legal actions such as protests
and pickets and illegal actions such as trespass, property destruction, or illegal
border crossings.
Third, disobedient communities are often well-versed in the national moral
vocabulary. Thus, they can engage the national community and its political
leaders for their inability to live up to some aspects of national ideas that are
short-changed or overlooked for more pressing concerns, such as security or the
delivery of emergency services.
V. TOWARD A PUBLIC SOLUTION: A TRUTH COMMISSION FOR
DISSENT
Unfortunately, the United States' lack of a practical mechanism for keeping
public attention focused on the complaints of civil disobedients is glaring.
Courts are inapt because they are so largely constituted and accustomed to
interpret and enforce law rather than to challenge national policy. Indeed,
judicial candidates are often publicly selected by appointing authorities for their
commitment to enforce the law, rather than to make it.'69 Moreover, because
they are often under attack for exceeding their constitutional powers by
169 See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court's Emerging Majority: Restraining the High
Court or Transforming Its Role? 24 AKRON L. REV. 393, 394-95 (1990) (noting President Bush's
concern that his nominees exercise judicial restraint and his statements about Judge David Souter's
nomination that he is "'committed to interpreting, not making the law. He recognizes the proper
role of judges is upholding the democratic choices of the people through their elected
representatives, with constitutional constraints."' (quoting Comments by President on His Choice of
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1990 at A8)).
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politicians 17 and as members of the public, judges naturally shy away from
speaking any serious truth to power. The Executive Branch has little interest in
seeing their initiatives undercut by dissenters, even when that undercutting is
only symbolic, rather than a real threat as in the case of the No More Deaths
volunteers saving a few lives in the desert.
This article proposes that the United States should adopt the time-honored
and now well-tested structure of a national truth commission, but permanently
constitute it as an independent agency, to respond to the claims of dissenter
groups that immoral American policy is causing them to have to choose between
the obligations of citizenship and the obligations of conscience. The truth
commission as an international rubric for public accountability has existed in
some form since the investigation of Balkan War crimes in 1912-13. 17 In the
contemporary period beginning in 1974, it has been successfully deployed in
more than two dozen nation-states in Africa, Europe, South and Central America,
and Southeast Asia172 to investigate and showcase human rights violations by
government. Moreover, at least one scholar, Rose Weston, has suggested the
employment of a truth commission to investigate historical mistreatment of
Native Americans in the U.S. 173 By examining the facts about human rights
violations that have occurred, and by reporting and publishing these findings, the
truth commission can have "a cathartic and educational effect on the society in
transition," by acknowledging government wrongdoing and accepting how
society has been involved in these tragic consequences so that reconciliation is
possible. 74 The purpose of a truth commission is to investigate moral wrong-
doing in morally and politically ambiguous situations, to bring to public light the
great harm to individual human beings caused by the rigid enforcement of
government policy that violates basic human decency, or by the lawless behavior
of politically ascendant groups.
The truth commission has the imprimatur of majoritarian legitimacy,
because it is constituted by the government whose actions are complained of by
170 Smith, supra note 169, at 394 (noting condemnations of Justice Brennan as "the worst kind of
judicial activist, willing to substitute his whims for the legislated preferences of the majority")
(quoting Kaplan, A Master Builder, NEWSWEEK, July 30, 1999, at 20).
171 See Rose Weston, Facing the Past, Facing the Future: Applying the Truth Commission Model to
the Historic Treatment of Native Americans in the United States, 18 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
1017, 1027 (2001).
172 Id. (noting that fifteen major truth commissions were conveyed in the two decades between
1974-94, including six between 1992-93). In one empirical study of post-World War II conflicts,
the International Human Rights Law Institute at DePaul University documented nine conflicts that
were the subject of truth commissions, while twenty-four resulted in national inquiries, twenty-two
in domestic prosecution of government perpetrators, and two in international prosecution. Dr.
Schlun notes that truth commissions were more popular in Latin America than in former Soviet
Union states like Lithuania or East Germany, which utilized investigative commissions to assess
the operations of KGB and other state repressive mechanisms. Angelika Schlun, Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions, 4 ILSA J. IN'TL & COMP. L. 415,416 (1998).
173 See Weston, supra note 171, at 1019.
174 Schlun, supra note 172, at 415-16.
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conscientious disobedients. Yet, it can speak truth to power, truth that power has
a difficult time speaking to itself because of fears that its political and moral
authority will be undercut by a public perception of vacillation or weakness. As
an independent body, the truth commission can level the playing-field of power
between officials and dissidents: it calls for accountability of powerful persons,
stripped of the trappings and protections of their office, through the rubric of
individual testimony, just as regular citizens bring forward their concerns through
individual testimony. However, as a body constituted largely to investigate and
report on moral wrongdoing, with little power to actually overturn laws or to
grant relief against the government without its permission, as courts can do, it
bears less risk that its actions will be attacked as improper constitutional or
political overreaching. Like other independent federal agencies, the members of
a truth commission can be appointed for terms of either six or ten years, which
would outlast immediate political alliances or electoral changeovers. Yet, the
appointment process brings to bear some accountability for the value and
soundness of its work through the political appointment process.
The truth commission relies on private citizens and government authorities,
both victims and perpetrators, to tell the stories of what they have heard and seen
in a public forum, which permits the wider public to be engaged in these stories
in ways that even Congressional investigations like Watergate cannot achieve. It
permits government officials to confess to their moral wrongdoing, even when
that wrongdoing is supported and required by their governments, by permitting
such confessions without legal retaliation. It permits citizens to admit their
violations of the law without criminal recrimination, by exchanging the right to
punish for the truth.
To be sure, the truth commission has been developed in circumstances more
tumultuous and dire than even the border "wars" in Arizona have become; in
circumstances where political reconciliation is, as Truth and Reconciliation
Commission research director Charles Villa-Vicencio recognizes, a political
necessity rather than a moral nicety. 75 But Dr. Villa-Vicencio's point reaches
beyond its location in African liberation wars. Political reconciliation is a
necessity, no less in democratic nation-states facing hotly contested issues
implicating strongly held beliefs, such as the United States, than in nations torn
apart by war, such as in Africa. Some might term reconciliation that comes from
truth-telling a "practical" necessity in the sense that it makes possible
"engagement between strangers and adversaries" who must learn to deal with
conflict in a humane manner rather than with physical or emotional violence, or
political estrangement. 176 However, reconciliation is also a necessity in the sense
that it makes a future structured in justice possible, through the acknowledgement
and remembrance of the truth as its pathway.
177
175 Charles Villa-Vicencio, Reconciliation as Political Necessity 1 (unpublished paper, on file with
author).
176 1d. at23.
177 Id. at 21-22.
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VI. CONCLUSION: A TALE OF TWO NATIONS-REWRITING THE
SCRIPT FOR NO MORE DEATHS
Creation of a truth commission would, of course, require numerous political
decisions to be made. The obvious political question might be how Congress
would take to being upstaged by an independent investigative body that could
take over much of the moral authority possessed intermittently by Congressional
investigating committees, such as the Watergate investigation. Presumably, the
truth commission would not substitute for such investigations where Congress
felt its own investigation was warranted; it would more likely respond to citizen
complaints that were being largely overlooked by Congress. Similar separation
of powers questions, such as whether such a commission could investigate
conscientious dissent against a state or local government practice, or the activities
of public non-governmental bodies such as a national corporation practicing
environmental racism in the location of its waste plants, would remain to be
decided.
The constitution of the truth commission, the delineation of its goals, the
limitations on the types of cases that could be brought before it, and the types of
relief it could offer would similarly need to be considered. In the case of South
Africa, for example, the TRC had the power to recommend legislation, but did
not have the power to award reparations to victims of government crimes. 7 8 It
had the power to give amnesty to wrongdoers if they would confess their crimes,
though not all truth commissions do.
179
To judge the validity of such a proposal, however, we might imagine what
difference it would make to Shanti Sellz and Daniel Strauss if the United States
Congress constituted a permanent truth tribunal to investigate claims of citizens
who felt morally drawn to civil disobedience to save lives.
If the Sanctuary cases, and the proceedings in the Sellz and Strauss case
prove any harbinger, the government's trial of future volunteers will not bend to
any claims that they were legally entitled to save lives. As the Sanctuary
movement defendants in United States v. Aguilar found, either their claims that
they were unsure whether the aliens they aided were truly illegal, or whether the
workers' actions in fact violated the law carried no weight.' 0 In Aguilar, the
Ninth Circuit rejected defenses that Sanctuary workers did not certainly know
refugees' status because they might have been eligible for asylum, as well as
claims that advice or assistance to persons crossing the border should not be
considered aid in the criminal sense. 181  Similarly, any arguments that
defendants' actions were justified by the Free Exercise Clause or by necessity
will most likely be excluded in future prosecutions.
178 Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: The
Conflict Between Individual Justice and National Healing in the Post-Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 753,761 (1998).
179 Id. at 761, 785.
180 871 F.2d at 1446-53.
1s1 Id.
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The jury in such cases will not be permitted to hear testimony about the
plight of those the defendants aided, the circumstances in which the defendants
felt it was incumbent upon them to aid those found ill in the desert, or the
defendants' claim that their actions were justified.182 Any juror who knows the
whole story or is sympathetic with their cause will undoubtedly be the subject of
"for cause" strikes by a prosecutorial team bent upon obtaining a guilty plea or
verdict. In the end, the federal judge will carefully instruct the jury to determine
only whether the defendants committed the acts alleged, and whether those
actions meet the narrow requirements of the law.
A truth commission, by contrast, would permit defendants like Sellz and
Strauss to bring their cases to public attention before indictment. They and their
fellow humanitarian workers might call upon the commission to investigate
United States law and policy in a more thorough way, and specifically to
examine the policy that has led to hundreds of thousands of immigrants risking
their lives crossing the desert. They would have the opportunity to testify,
perhaps under a grant of immunity from the commission, about their actions in
saving the lives of these refugees. At the same time, the commission could call
those responsible for border security to testify truthfully and in depth about the
procedures they have put in place for responding to emergencies involving
border-crossing refugees, their procedures for handling refugees that are arrested,
and the alternatives they have considered to save more lives.
With a national truth commission, mediating institutions--church bodies
and human rights advocacy groups--could present testimony about the effects of
such humanitarian disasters on their human rights efforts. Local governments
reeling under heavy financial and other burdens from immigration would have
the opportunity to inform a national public about the humane efforts they have
undertaken, and the enforcement measures they have taken. Media attention,
potentially including national broadcasts of the proceedings, could be attracted to
these stories. A true and somewhat objective record of the events occurring at
the border, that is at least somewhat divorced from particular political partisans'
needs to find witnesses to support their legislation, would have a better chance of
resolving the problem.
In the end, however, a truth commission will not be established nor will it
be permitted to function properly to bring the truth of tragedies that humanitarian
volunteers such as Sellz and Strauss are seeing, unless those who bear the power
acknowledge the need for truth-telling and national moral reflection on the
nation's policies. Ultimately, the political branches will bear the responsibility
for developing and sustaining a commitment to U.S. policy which is not only
effective in preserving national interests narrowly understood, but in preserving a
national moral identity, broadly understood. We may only wonder what a
difference it might have made if the Wounded Knee or Kent State protesters, or
those at the sites of many other conflicts of power and conscience, had had a
nationally recognized forum to tell their stories.
182 See Bezdek, supra note 17, at 953-54, 957 (noting refusal of the Sanctuary defendants' courts to
submit jury instructions or other defenses to the jury).
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